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Abstract 
We study the impact of the minimum wage on firm exit in the restaurant 
industry, exploiting recent changes in the minimum wage at the city level. 
The evidence suggests that higher minimum wages increase overall exit 
rates for restaurants. However, lower quality restaurants, which are already 
closer to the margin of exit, are disproportionately impacted by increases to 
the minimum wage. Our point estimates suggest that a one dollar increase in 
the minimum wage leads to a 14 percent increase in the likelihood of exit 
for a 3.5-star restaurant (which is the median rating), but has no discernible 
impact for a 5-star restaurant (on a 1 to 5 star scale).  
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I. Introduction 
 The minimum wage has recently re-entered the forefront of policy discourse as federal 
proposals range from leaving it as is, or increasing it to $10.10 or even higher. Some proposals 
include raising the federal minimum to uncharted territory of $15 per hour.1  While the federal 
minimum wage has remained stagnant since 2009, states – and more recently, cities – have 
increasingly set local minimum wages above the federal mandate of $7.25. In the San Francisco 
Bay Area alone, there have been twenty-one local minimum wage changes over the past decade.  
 In this paper, we investigate the impact of the minimum wage on restaurant closures 
using data from the San Francisco Bay Area. We find suggestive evidence that an increase in the 
minimum wage leads to an overall increase in the rate of exit. However, this masks important 
heterogeneity. At any minimum wage level, lower quality restaurants, as proxied by their ratings 
on the review platform Yelp are more likely to exit. Moreover, lower quality restaurants are 
disproportionately affected by minimum wage increases. In other words, the impact of the 
minimum wage on exit is more pronounced among lower-rated restaurants.  
 The restaurant industry in the Bay Area makes a compelling setting to investigate the 
impact of the minimum wage on small businesses. First, the restaurant industry is the most 
intensive employer of minimum wage workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016b). Second, 
there is high turnover within the restaurant industry. In our sample – which covers restaurants in 
the Bay Area from 2008 through 2016 – roughly 5 percent of restaurants go out of business each 
year. Hence, the exit margin is economically meaningful. Additionally, there is no tip credit in 
                                                 
1 While his exact stance on the minimum wage is not clear, President Trump has intimated that he would prefer to 
eliminate the federal minimum wage and let states determine their own minimum wages 
(http://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-presidential-debate-fact-check/2016/10/trump-kaine-minimum-wage-229149). 
Bernie Sanders proposed a $15 federal minimum wage as part of his presidential campaign in 2016 
(https://berniesanders.com/issues/a-living-wage/). 
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California.  Hence, tips do not count toward the official wage and wait staff are covered by the 
same minimum wage as other employees, so the minimum wage is more likely to be binding. 
Finally, there has been a substantial number of city-level minimum wage increases in the area 
since 2008, with a number of cities implementing minimum wages upwards of $12.  
 Our analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we provide evidence that lower quality 
businesses are, on average, closer to the margin of exit and fail at higher rates than higher quality 
restaurants irrespective of the minimum wage level. A one-star increase in rating is associated 
with more than a 50% decrease in the likelihood of going out of business. This qualitative 
relationship holds both with and without restaurant effects.  
We then exploit the multiple city-level minimum wage changes in recent years across the 
Bay Area to implement a difference-in-differences design to investigate the effects of the 
minimum wage. We find suggestive evidence that a higher minimum wage leads to overall 
increases in restaurant exit rates – depending on the specification, we find that a $1 increase in 
the minimum wage leads to approximately a 4 to 10 percent increase in the likelihood of exit, 
although the estimate is only statistically significant in certain specifications. 
 Next, we present robust evidence that the impact of the minimum wage varies with the 
rating of the business. Our point estimates suggest that a $1 increase in the minimum wage leads 
to an approximate 14 percent increase in the likelihood of exit for the median 3.5-star restaurant 
but the impact falls to zero for five-star restaurants. These effects are robust to a number of 
different specifications, including controlling for time-varying county characteristics that may 
influence both minimum wage policies and restaurant demand, city-specific time trends to 
account for preexisting trends, as well as county-year fixed effects to control for spatial 
heterogeneity in exit trends. 
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 Our results contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, our findings relate 
to a large literature seeking to estimate the impact of the minimum wage, most of which has 
focused on identifying employment effects. While some studies find no detrimental effects on 
employment (Card and Krueger 1994, 1998; Dube, Lester & Reich, 2010), others show that 
higher minimum wage reduces employment, especially among low-skilled workers (see 
Neumark & Wascher, 2007 for a review). However, even studies that identify negative impacts 
find fairly modest effects overall, suggesting that firms adjust to higher labor costs in other ways. 
For example, several studies have documented price increases as a response to the minimum 
wage hikes (Aaronson, 2001; Aaronson, French, & MacDonald, 2008; Allegretto & Reich, 
2016). Horton (2017) find that firms reduce employment at the intensive margin rather than on 
the extensive margin, choosing to cut employees hours rather than counts. Draca et al. (2011) 
document lower profitability among firms for which the minimum wage may be more binding. 
  Our study contributes to the existing literature by examining one channel of adjustment to 
the minimum wage that has received relatively little attention – firms could exit the market 
altogether. We provide suggestive evidence that the minimum wage increases overall restaurant 
exit. This finding is consistent with Aaronson et al. (forthcoming), who use a border 
discontinuity approach to show that restaurant exit increases after the minimum wage increases.  
 However, our results reveal that the average treatment effect can be substantially 
different from the impact on sets of businesses that are predictably closer to the margin. While 
lower rated restaurants are driven to exit by increases to the minimum wage, higher rated 
restaurants tend to be more insulated from such shocks. This helps to shed light on the likely 
impact of minimum wage increases on existing businesses. .  
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 Our analysis also highlights how digital data can be used to better understand labor policy 
and the economy. Historically, datasets from the US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) have formed the backbone of analyses looking to estimate the impact of the 
minimum wage in the US (e.g. Dube, Lester & Reich, 2010, Aaronson et al., forthcoming). Other 
analyses consist mainly of researcher-administered surveys (e.g. Katz & Krueger, 1992; Card & 
Krueger, 1994).   
 While administrative datasets are critical to our understanding of the minimum wage and 
the economy more generally, the effects we identify in this paper would have been difficult to 
observe using standard datasets. The growth of online review platforms such as Yelp allows for 
unique insights into the economy. First, we can use each restaurant’s rating as a proxy for its 
quality, , a measure that is not captured by conventional datasets. This lets us to evaluate whether 
the minimum wage differentially impacts lower quality businesses. Second, we are able to use 
exit data in close to real time, whereas BLS and Census data only become publicly available 
after a lag. This allows researchers and policymakers to more quickly understand the impacts of 
different economic policies. Third, we are able to observe granular data on businesses, whereas 
the public versions of the Census and BLS data are aggregated to coarser geographic levels, such 
as by county (depending on the variable the researcher is interested in). In principle, researchers 
can access restricted business-level data via an extensive application process, but the current 
waiting period for access even among approved applications is estimated to be two years. For 
example, a researcher trying to understand the impact of a policy change in 2017 would not be 
able to examine firm-level microdata from the Census until at least 2020. By using digital data, 
researchers can measure the impacts in close to real time.  
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 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the landscape of minimum wages 
across the United States in recent years in Section II. Section III discusses the data and empirical 
evidence, as well as graphical evidence. Section IV reports the main results, and Section V 
concludes. 
II. The Minimum Wage in Recent Years 
 The current federal minimum wage of $7.25 is binding for roughly 2.6 million hourly 
workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016a), with the restaurant industry having the highest 
percent of employees at the minimum (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016b). In addition to the 
$7.25 federal minimum wage rate, 29 states and 41 cities have introduced higher than federal 
minimum wage. For example, San Francisco is set to increase its minimum wage to $15 in July 
2018 from its current wage of $12.25. 
 We focus our analysis on the Bay Area, a region comprising of 101 cities surrounding the 
San Francisco Bay. The Bay Area is home to more than 7.5 million people, and includes the 
major cities and metropolitan areas of San Jose, San Francisco, and Oakland. Among the 41 
cities and counties that have changed their minimum wage ordinances at the local level since 
2012, 15 were in the Bay Area.2 We document 21 total local changes during our sample period 
from 2008 through 2016, with four additional cities set to increase their minimum beginning in 
2017. Beyond the wide variation in minimum wage, focusing on a single region potentially 
allows us to better control for macroeconomic trends and attitudes towards labor standards.  
                                                 
2 See http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-wage-resources/inventory-of-us-city-and-county-
minimum-wage-ordinances/ 
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 Figure 1 depicts the changes for the state of California and 11 cities in the state of 
California that have increased their minimum wage since 2008.3 In cities with separate minimum 
wages for large (usually defined as over 500 employees) and small companies, we use the 
minimum wage for small companies. This is because the majority of full-service and limited-
service restaurants have fewer than 500 employees (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). At the state 
level, the minimum wage was set at $8 in the beginning of the sample, increased to $9 in 2014, 
and then to $10 in 2016. 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy  
A. Restaurant Data 
 Our underlying restaurant data are obtained from Yelp, as part of an ongoing economic 
research initiative done in collaboration with the company. Yelp was founded in 2004 in San 
Francisco and is now the dominant review platform in the US. On Yelp, users can leave text 
reviews and ratings (from 1 to 5) for individual businesses, ranging from dry cleaners to dentists. 
However, it is perhaps best known as a review platform for restaurants. 
 We start with the universe of all Yelp reviews for the Bay Area since 2008, and limit the 
dataset to only reviews for full-service and limited-service restaurants. Based on the review-level 
data, we form an unbalanced panel dataset at the restaurant-month level, where a restaurant 
enters the panel when it becomes active on Yelp (either by the owner registering the business, a 
reviewer registering the business, or receiving the first review), and leaves the panel after it has 
been marked as having been closed on Yelp.  
                                                 
3 Four additional cities (San Leandro, Cupertino, Los Altos, San Mateo) are slated to increase their minimum wage 
above the state level in 2017.           
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 The indicator for restaurant exit is crowdsourced. On each restaurant’s Yelp page, users 
have the option of updating the restaurant’s business details, including tagging it as having 
closed or moved. Any suggested changes are then verified by Yelp moderators before being 
marked as such on the restaurant’s profile page. In practice, timing of exit through Yelp may also 
be more accurate than official administrative data, which contains nontrivial reporting lags and 
errors. In the review data, we exclude filtered reviews, which are deemed by Yelp’s algorithm as 
more likely to be fake or untrustworthy (Luca & Zervas, 2016). The dataset contains basic 
information about the restaurant, including the type of cuisine (e.g., “New American”, 
“Chinese”), the price category of the restaurant (denoted by dollar signs ranging from $ to $$$$, 
with four dollar signs being the most expensive)4, the exact location, and also time-varying 
characteristics such as the running average rating, the number of reviews, and exit status.5  
 Yelp coverage of restaurants is close to universal in the Bay Area. Comparing Yelp data 
to administrative data obtained for the city of San Francisco,6 the number of restaurants active at 
the end of 2016 is 6,087 and 5,808 based on the San Francisco administrative and Yelp data, 
respectively. Exit statistics generated from the two datasets are similar and consistent with 
previous research. For example, a common statistic that the restaurant industry focuses on is the 
rate of closure within one year of entry. Based on the administrative data, 19.8 percent of 
restaurants exit within one year of entry, whereas Yelp data indicates 20.9 percent. Other 
research on the restaurant industry has demonstrated similar numbers ranging from 23 percent in 
                                                 
4 Price category is a crowd sourced element. Upon reviewing a restaurant, users are able to designate dollar signs 
based on the following criteria: $= under $10, $$=11–30, $$$=31–60, $$$$= over $61. 
5 We constructed these variables such that they capture the measure at the end of the month, for example, the 
running average of the restaurant at the end of the month, or the displayed rating at the end of the month. 
6 SF OpenData is the central clearinghouse for data published by the City and County of San Francisco, and includes 
a database of registered businesses that pay taxes, including their date of entry and exit. We restricted to the NAICS 
code of 722 (full-service restaurants and limited-service restaurants). 
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Dallas, Texas (Cline Group, 2003) to around 26 percent in Columbus, Ohio (Parsa, Self, Njite, & 
King, 2005). 
 We present two descriptive statistics of the data. The first set of statistics provides a 
snapshot of the restaurants’ last appearance in the panel, i.e., at the end of 2016 or at the time of 
exit (Table 1 Panel A). There are 35,173 unique restaurants in our dataset, with a mean number 
of 184 reviews per restaurant and an average rating of 3.6.7 Among the entire universe of 
restaurants, around 30 percent have closed. Restaurants remain in the panel for an average of 70 
months8 and have an average price sign of 1.6 “dollar signs”.  
 The second set of statistics shows a summary at the monthly panel level (Table 1 Panel 
B). A restaurant receives on average 2.5 new reviews each month with an average rating of 3.5. 
The likelihood of exit in any month is 0.4 percent.  
B. Graphical Evidence 
 We first present graphical evidence of the relationship between a restaurant’s operational 
status and its rating. Figure 2a depicts a snapshot of the overall distribution of restaurant ratings 
when last observed in the dataset. The modal rating is 3.5, and ratings are generally more 
positive than negative; there are fewer than 5 percent of restaurants with ratings 2 and below, 
whereas 40 percent of restaurants have an average rating of 4 or above. Figure 2b overlays the 
distribution by whether the restaurant has closed. The mass of ratings for closed restaurants is 
concentrated towards lower ratings relative to operating restaurants, suggesting that a 
restaurant’s rating is correlated with closure 
                                                 
7 While Yelp displays ratings rounded to the nearest 0.5 on their website, we use unrounded version in the analysis. 
(Whether we use the rounded or unrounded version of ratings does not affect the conclusions of our analysis.) 
8 Note that this statistic may not accurately represent average lifespan of a restaurant since when the restaurant 
becomes active on Yelp may not necessarily be the same as when the restaurant began operations.  
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 We further explore this by plotting the simple means of the monthly likelihood of exit by 
displayed rating (which is the average rating rounded to the nearest 0.5). Figure 3 depicts a clear 
negative relationship between the likelihood of exit and rating, again implying that restaurants 
with lower ratings are closer to the margin of exit. 
 Next we explore the cross-sectional relationship between the likelihood of exit and the 
minimum wage. Figure 4 plots the mean likelihood of exit by minimum wage, which shows a 
distinctly positive correlation. However, it is possible that larger or wealthier cities implement 
the minimum wage, and exit rates are systematically different (higher) in those cities as well. To 
investigate this, we obtain the residuals from regressing the likelihood of exit on city dummies, 
and plot the mean residuals against the minimum wage (Figure 5). While the slope is less 
pronounced, there still remains a positive relationship between the minimum wage and the 
likelihood of exit.  
 Figure 6 examines the likelihood of exit by restaurant rating and minimum wage. The 
figure synthesizes our empirical strategy and our main result: at any rating level, the likelihood 
of exit is higher when the minimum wage is higher. However, the increase in the likelihood of 
exit is greater for lower rated restaurants, and there does not appear to be any penalty for the 
highest rated restaurants. We confirm this finding using a regression framework in Section 4. 
C. Empirical Strategy 
 The graphical evidence presented in Section 3.B suggests three things. First, restaurants 
with lower ratings are more likely to exit. Second, higher minimum wages are correlated with 
higher probabilities of exit. Third, the increase in the likelihood of exit is greater for lower rated 
restaurants. 
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 , We then use a difference-in-difference framework to empirically analyze the impact of 
the minimum wage on restaurant exit decisions, in which exploit the temporal and spatial 
variation in minimum wage increases at the city level across the Bay Area. The basic regression 
model, estimated as a linear probability model, is as follow: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙′𝑡𝜆 + 𝛽𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛿 + Ζ′𝑗𝑡𝜌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
 where 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a binary variable denoting whether restaurant i in city j has exited by 
time t. 𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 is the minimum wage (measured in dollar amounts) in that city, 𝛼𝑖 are restaurant 
fixed effects, 𝜙′𝑡 is a vector of time controls, including year and quarter dummies to capture 
variation in macroeconomic conditions and seasonal variation in restaurant demand. 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡 are 
time-varying restaurant measures, such as the number of ratings and lagged running average 
rating.9 Ζ′𝑗𝑡 includes a host of county-level time-varying characteristics that may influence both 
restaurant demand and minimum wage policies, including the percent of young workers between 
ages 15 to 24, percent black, percent under the poverty line, the unemployment rate, and logged 
per capita income.  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. In some specifications, we include city-specific time 
trends to account for preexisting trends in local exit rates. We also include county-year fixed 
effects in certain specifications to control for spatial heterogeneity in exit trends that are 
unrelated to minimum wage policies. The estimated impact of a $1 increase in the minimum 
wage is then given by ?̂?. Standard errors are clustered by city to allow for serial correlation 
within locale. 
                                                 
9 Restaurant characteristics that are constant over time, such as the price category, location, type of cuisine, are 
controlled implicitly by restaurant fixed effects. 
12 
 
 We also enter the city-level minimum wage as the proportional increase over the state 
mandate, 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡. As an example, if the state minimum wage is $8 and the city minimum wage is 
$9, the 𝐺𝑎𝑝 measure would be 12.5. This measure reflects both increases in minimum wage 
within the city as well as relative to the state mandate.  
 We then estimate the heterogeneous effects of the minimum wage by including an 
interaction term of the minimum wage with the restaurant’s rating. More specifically, our 
estimating equation becomes:  
       𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙
′
𝑡𝜆 + 𝛽𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 +  𝛾𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜃𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛿 + Ζ′𝑗𝑡𝜌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (2) 
 where 𝜃 would provide an estimate of how the minimum wage affects exit by the 
restaurant’s quality, as measured by its rating. 
IV. Main Results 
 As in our graphical evidence, we first examine the relationship between a restaurant’s 
likelihood of exit and its Yelp rating (Table 2). Cross-sectionally, a one-star increase in rating is 
associated with a 0.09 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of exit in any given month 
(column 1), which is consistent with Figure 3. After controlling for restaurant fixed and calendar 
fixed effects, the coefficient increases to approximately -0.29 percentage point (Column 2). The 
relationship remains stable when we include time-varying county characteristics, city-specific 
time trends and county-year fixed effects (Columns 3-5). Our results imply a one-star increase in 
rating is associated with a decline in the likelihood of exit of around 70 percent. This is not 
necessarily a causal relationship – it is certainly possible that poor quality restaurants are both 
more likely to exit and receive worse ratings. It could also be that lower ratings directly 
contribute to restaurants exiting; as Luca (2011) shows, a one-star increase in Yelp rating leads 
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to a 5 to 9 percent increase in restaurant revenue. Our objective is to test whether restaurants with 
lower ratings tend to be closer to the margin of exit. 
 We find suggestive evidence that higher minimum wage increases restaurant exit (Table 
3). Panel A reports the coefficients on the minimum wage entered as a dollar measure in the 
regression model, whereas Panel B reports those on the Gap variable as defined in Section III.C, 
which is a measure of how much the city minimum wage is above the state mandate. Cross-
sectionally, a one-dollar increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 0.09 percentage 
point increase in the probability of exit, which represents a 22 percent increase (Panel A Column 
1). However, the estimate falls to 0.04 percentage points and loses statistical significance when 
we layer on restaurant and calendar fixed effects (Panel A Column 2). The estimate becomes 
even more imprecise when we include time-varying county characteristics that may influence 
both minimum wage policy and restaurant demand, city-specific time trends, and county-year 
fixed effects (Panel A Columns 3-5) 
 We find similar results when we examine the impact of the minimum wage as the percent 
increase over the state mandate, which may give a better measure of the “bite” of the minimum 
wage. Depending on the specification, our estimates suggest that a 10-percent increase of the 
local minimum wage over the state mandate would increase the overall exit rate ranges from 
0.016 to 0.04 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase in the likelihood of exit of 4 to 
10 percent. While the estimates are generally more precise than in Panel A, they only reach 
statistical significance in certain specifications.   
 Overall impacts could mask underlying heterogeneous effects if the minimum wage 
differentially affects restaurants of varying quality. To examine this, we include the interaction 
effect between a restaurant’s rating and the minimum wage, as specified in Equation (2). Table 4 
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reports the main results of our paper: the minimum wage increases the likelihood of exit, but the 
impact falls for higher-rated restaurants. The estimates remain similar across the different 
specifications. Based on the estimates in Column (2), the results would suggest that the impact of 
a $1 rise in the minimum wage would increase the likelihood of exit for the median restaurant on 
Yelp (i.e., a 3.5 star restaurant) by around 0.055 percentage points, which is approximately 14 
percent. For a 5-star restaurant, this impacts falls to close to zero.  
 The results are consistent when we enter the minimum wage in the model as the percent 
above the state mandate (Table 5). A one-star increase in Yelp rating is associated with a 0.26 
percentage point decline in the likelihood of exit for a restaurant in a city with the minimum 
wage equal to the state mandate, which is consistent with the results from Table 2. Further, the 
impact of the minimum wage varies by restaurant quality: a 10 percent increase in the minimum 
wage above the state mandate increases the likelihood of exit for a 3.5-star restaurant by 0.05 
percentage points, translating into a 13.75 percent increase. The impact falls roughly by 0.09 
percentage points for each star increase . The estimates are similar and statistically significant 
with city-specific time trends and county-year fixed effects. Finally, Figure 7 plots the predicted 
likelihood of exit by rating for different minimum wages from the specification in Table 4 
Column 5, and echoes Figure 6. The figure shows that the predicted likelihood of exit is 
generally higher across ratings when the minimum wage is higher, but the impact, as well as the 
difference in impact across the three lines, shrinks as rating increases.  
V. Further Investigation 
A. Are Results Driven by Restaurant Prices? 
 If ratings are systematically correlated with prices – e.g., if cheap restaurants tend to 
receive low ratings, and expensive restaurants high ratings – then our results in Tables 4 and 5 
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may be confounded. Further, it could be that more expensive restaurants already pay wages 
above the minimum, and hence are less affected by minimum wage hikes. Are the heterogeneous 
effects we observe driven by how expensive the restaurant is rather than its quality? 
 We empirically examine this question by replacing 𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 in Equation 2 with 
the interaction term of the restaurant’s price category (represented by dollar signs on Yelp) and 
the minimum wage 𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 (Table 6). The coefficient on the interaction term is small and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effects of the minimum wage along the price 
dimension are not significantly different (Column 1). When we include 𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 in the 
model as well, the coefficient on 𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 remains insignificant, whereas the coefficient on 
𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 are statistically significant and similar in magnitude to those in Table 5, 
providing evidence that the heterogeneous effects observed earlier are driven by quality rather 
than by the restaurant prices. 
B. Impact on Entry  
 A natural follow-up question to our results on exit is the impact of the minimum wage on 
entry. Dates on restaurant entry only became regularly recorded by Yelp at the end of 2009,  
hence we restrict our entry analysis to the post-2010 period. To examine entry, we generate a 
city-level panel dataset based on our restaurant-level dataset and estimate the analogous version 
of Equation (1) using the entry rate as the dependent variable, weighted by the number of 
restaurants on Yelp in that city.  
 Table 7 reports the results of this exercise. First, we find similar overall impacts of the 
minimum wage on exit as our restaurant-level analysis (Columns 1-3). Next, we find that the 
entry rate in fact declines with minimum wage increases – depending on the specification, the 
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entry rate declines by 0.025 to 0.045 percentage points from a base of 0.6 percent from a $1 
increase in the minimum wage, corresponding to an approximate 4 to 6 percent reduction. The 
number of restaurants per capita falls as expected, but the estimates are not statistically 
significant (Columns 7-9).  
 Our results suggest that higher minimum wages deter entry. Previous research on entry 
has produced mixed findings. Using a border discontinuity approach and data from Dun and 
Bradstreet Marketplace files, Rohlin (2011) finds that minimum wages hikes implemented 
between 2003 and 2006 discouraged firm entry – a $1 increase in the minimum wage decreased 
the share of new establishments in an area relative to its comparison area by approximately 6 
percent. Draca and Machin (2011) find some suggestive evidence that net entry rates decline 
after the imposition of a national minimum wage in the United Kingdom. In contrast, Aaronson 
et al. (forthcoming) finds that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases the entry rate 
by roughly 14 percent from a mean of 8.7 percent using a similar border discontinuity approach 
and QCEW data.  
C. Impact on Survival 
 In addition to the overall monthly likelihood of exit, we examine the effect of the 
minimum wage on restaurant time to exit. Since this relies on accurate coding of entry dates, we 
also restrict the analysis to after 2010. We estimate a survival model where the dependent 
variable is time to exit using a Weibull distribution (Table 8). The coefficients indicate that 
overall, the minimum wage increases the hazard rate, but the estimates are not statistically 
significant (Columns 1 and 3). However, when we interact the minimum wage with the 
restaurant’s rating, we can see that the coefficient on the interaction term of minimum wage (or 
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gap) with rating is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the speed to exit is 
accelerated for poorly rated restaurants (Columns 2 and 4).  
V. Discussion 
 This paper presents several new findings. First, we provide suggestive evidence that 
higher minimum wage increases overall exit rates among restaurants, where a $1 increase in the 
minimum wage leads to approximately a 4 to 10 percent increase in the likelihood of exit, 
although statistical significance falls with the inclusion of time-varying county-level 
characteristics and city-specific time trends. This is qualitatively consistent but smaller than what 
Aaronson et al. (forthcoming) find; they show that a 10 percent raise in the minimum wage 
increases firm exit by approximately 24 percent from a base of 5.7 percent. Differences in 
sample and specifications may account for the differences between our study and theirs.  
 Next, we examine heterogeneous impacts of the minimum wage on restaurant exit by 
restaurant quality. The textbook competitive labor market model assumes identical workers and 
firms who therefore are equally likely to share in the minimum-wage generated employment and 
profit losses. However, models that depart from the standard competitive model to allow for 
heterogeneous workers and firms suggest that a minimum wage increase would cause the lowest 
productivity firms to exit the market (Albrecht & Axell, 1984; Eckstein & Wolpin, 1990; Flinn, 
2006). We show that there is, in fact, considerable and predictable heterogeneity in the effects of 
the minimum wage, and that the impact on exit is concentrated among lower quality restaurants, 
which are already closer to the margin of exit. This suggests that the ability of firms to adjust to 
minimum wage changes could differ depending on firm quality. Finally, we provide evidence 
that higher minimum wages deter entry, and hastens the time to exit among poorly rated 
restaurants.  
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 Our findings suggest directions for future research. First, because most minimum wage 
changes in our sample are relatively new, our results should be considered short-term impacts. 
Second, while we find that the minimum wage reduces net entry slightly, it is unclear how 
employment would be affected given that the scale of entering or incumbent restaurants could 
change.10 Third, our results raise the possibility that higher rated restaurants may adjust to higher 
minimum wages through other channels, such as substituting toward higher productivity workers 
when faced with a minimum wage (Horton, 2017), especially if higher quality restaurants are 
able to assortatively match with more productive workers (Eeckhout & Kircher, 2011; Mendes et 
al., 2010).  
 Our results also demonstrate the potential for digital exhaust from online platforms to 
complement standard data sources to provide unique insight in policy evaluations.  Glaeser et al 
(forthcoming) hypothesize that data from online platforms might provide dependent variables 
that are more granular and closer to real time, as well as independent variables that provide 
insight into dimensions of markets that were previously unobservable. Our analysis provides a 
case study in this, showing how digital exhaust from Yelp can further our understanding of the 
impact of the minimum wage.  
   
                                                 
10 The limited existing evidence on the interaction effect of firm dynamics and employment has been mixed. 
Anderson et al. (forthcoming) find the minimum wage increases exit (and entry) but do not find any impacts on 
employment. Draca and Machin (2011) find some evidence that minimum wages decreases net entry but no 
significant effects on employment. 
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Figure 1. Minimum wage increases in the San Francisco Bay Area 
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Figure 2a. Overall distribution of Yelp ratings 
 
Figure 2b. Closed restaurants have lower ratings
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Figure 3. Lower rated restaurants are more likely to exit 
 
Note: This figure plots the monthly likelihood of exit at each Yelp rating. 
Figure 4. Minimum wage and likelihood of exit 
 
Note: This figure plots the simple means of the likelihood of exit at each minimum wage. 
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Figure 5. Minimum wage and likelihood of exit (within city) 
 
Note: This figure plots the simple means of the residuals of regressing the likelihood of 
exit on city fixed effects at each minimum wage. 
 
Figure 6. Minimum wage increases exit, but more so for worse restaurants 
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Figure 7. Predicted likelihoods of exit by minimum wage and rating 
 
Note: This figure plots the predicted likelihood of exit by rating and the percent increase 
of local minimum wage above the state mandate based on the estimates from Table 4 
Column 5. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Number of restaurants 35,173         
Number of ratings 2,392,766         
            
Panel A: Summary statistics at the restaurant level (at time of last appearance 
in panel) 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev Min  Max Obs. 
Total number of ratings 184.4 327.1 10 9781 35,173 
Rating 3.564 0.691 1 5 35,173 
Closed 0.301 0.459 0 1 35,173 
Price category 1.588 0.603 1 4 35,173 
Age of restaurants (months) 67.73 36.52 1 107 35,173 
Minimum wage ($) 10.49 1.534 8 13 35,173 
Percent higher than state 
mw (%) 9.839 12.84 0 36 35,173 
            
 
Panel B: Summary statistics at the restaurant-month level  
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev Min  Max Obs. 
Incoming ratings 3.535 1.105 1 5 1,430,061 
Number of incoming ratings 2.454 4.790 0 690 2,383,558 
Average running rating 3.570 0.707 1 5 2,376,580 
Exited (%) 0.464 6.792 0 100 2,392,766 
Minimum wage ($) 9.033 1.291 8 13 2,392,766 
Percent higher than state 
mw (%) 
7.346 11.77 0 36.1 2,392,766 
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 Table 2. Are lower rated restaurants more likely to exit?  
  Likelihood of Exit  
  (Mean = 0.4%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Rating -0.0938*** -0.2893*** -0.2910*** -0.2935*** -0.2917*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0277) (0.0287) (0.0280) (0.0290) 
            
            
Restaurant FE   x x x x 
Calendar FE   x x x x 
Time-varying county 
characteristics     x x x 
City-specific time trend       x   
County-year FE         x 
            
Standard errors are clustered at the city level         
Number of observations = 2,392,766         
Calendar fixed effects = dummies for season and year       
 
Table 3. Overall minimum wage effects on restaurant exit  
  Likelihood of Exit  
  (Mean = 0.4%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Minimum Wage 0.0929*** 0.0444 0.0174 -0.0132 0.0263 
  (0.0079) (0.0284) (0.0197) (0.0134) (0.0181) 
            
Panel B: Gap 0.0062*** 0.0045* 0.0026 0.0016 0.0040** 
  (0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
            
Restaurant FE   x x x x 
Calendar FE   x x x x 
Time-varying county 
characteristics     x x x 
City-specific time trend       x   
County-year FE         x 
            
Standard errors are clustered at the city level         
Gap is a measure of the proportional increase of the city minimum wage over the state mandate 
Number of observations = 2,392,766         
Calendar fixed effects = dummies for season and year       
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Table 4. Heterogeneous effects of the minimum wage as a dollar measure 
  Likelihood of Exit (%) 
  (Mean = 0.4%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Minimum wage 0.1639*** 0.2336*** 0.2047*** 0.1746** 0.2148*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0786) (0.0730) (0.0696) (0.0732) 
            
Rating 0.0653 0.1598 0.1521 0.1514 0.1526 
  (0.0547) (0.1341) (0.1387) (0.1406) (0.1403) 
            
Minimum Wage * Rating -0.0190*** -0.0527*** -0.0520*** -0.0522*** -0.0521*** 
  (0.0064) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0174) 
            
            
Restaurant FE   x x x x 
Calendar FE   x x x x 
Time-varying county 
characteristics     x x x 
City-specific time trend       x   
County-year FE         x 
Standard errors are clustered at the city level         
Number of observations = 2,370,963         
Calendar fixed effects = dummies for season and year       
 
Table 5. Heterogeneous effects of the minimum wage measured as the proportional 
increase above the state mandate 
  Likelihood of Exit (%) 
  (Mean = 0.4%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gap 0.0170*** 0.0371*** 0.0338*** 0.0325*** 0.0349*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0096) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0082) 
            
Rating -0.0831*** -0.2557*** -0.2589*** -0.2615*** -0.2597*** 
  (0.0101) (0.0218) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0206) 
            
Gap * Rating -0.0029*** -0.0091*** -0.0087*** -0.0086*** -0.0086*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
            
            
Restaurant FE   x x x x 
Calendar FE   x x x x 
Time-varying county 
characteristics     x x x 
City-specific time trend       x   
County-year FE         x 
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Table 6. Are results driven by restaurant prices? 
  Likelihood of Exit (%) 
  0.4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A         
Minimum Wage 0.0125 0.1921** 0.1654** 0.2029** 
  (0.0300) (0.0796) (0.0758) (0.0803) 
          
Minimum Wage * Price  0.0019 0.0059 0.0035 0.0054 
  (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0107) 
          
Rating   0.1464 0.1452 0.1479 
    (0.1424) (0.1441) (0.1435) 
          
Minimum Wage * Rating   -0.0516*** -0.0518*** -0.0519*** 
    (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
          
Panel B         
Gap 0.0019 0.0339*** 0.0330*** 0.0352*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0076) 
          
Gap * Price  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
          
Rating   -0.2607*** -0.2633*** -0.2616*** 
    (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
          
Gap * Rating   -0.0089*** -0.0088*** -0.0088*** 
    (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
          
Restaurant FE x x x x 
Calendar FE x x x x 
Time-varying county characteristics x x x x 
City-specific time trend x   x   
County-year FE       x 
Standard errors are clustered at the city level       
Price indicates the price category of the restaurant, which ranges from 1 to 4 
Gap is a measure of the proportional increase of the city minimum wage over the state 
mandate 
Number of observations = 2,370,963       
Calendar fixed effects = dummies for season and year     
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Table 7. Minimum wage effects on exit, entry, and number of restaurants 
  Exit rate (%)  Entry rate (%) Restaurants per 10,000 pop 
  (Mean = 0.4) (Mean = 0.6) (Mean = 45.3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Minimum Wage 0.0038 -0.0030 0.0185 -0.0425*** -0.0251* -0.0449** -0.1989 -0.1149 -0.1470 
  (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0193) (0.1478) (0.1187) (0.1534) 
          
Gap 0.0018* 0.0018 0.0037*** -0.0035*** -0.0026*** -0.0041*** -0.0102 -0.0026 -0.0096 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0098) (0.0079) (0.0117) 
                    
Restaurant FE x x x x x x x x x 
Calendar FE x x x x x x x x x 
Time-varying county 
characteristics 
x x x x x x x x x 
City-specific time trend   x     x     x   
County-year FE     x     x     x 
Each cell represents a different regression. Regressions are weighted by the number of restaurants at the city level.     
Standard errors are clustered at the city level               
Gap is a measure of the proportional increase of the city minimum wage over the state mandate       
Number of observations = 8,134                 
Calendar fixed effects = dummies for season and 
year               
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Table 8. The impact of the minimum wage on survival rates  
  Hazard Rate (Failure = Exit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Minimum wage 0.0333 0.4197***     
  (0.0429) (0.0854)     
          
Minimum wage * 
Rating   -0.1027***     
    (0.0199)     
          
Gap     0.0046 0.0309*** 
      (0.0036) (0.0076) 
          
Gap * Rating       -0.0071*** 
        (0.0018) 
          
Rating   0.8606***   -0.0133 
    (0.1707)   (0.0188) 
          
          
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Coefficients are reported. 
Gap is a measure of the proportional increase of the city minimum wage over 
the state mandate 
Number of observations = 18,631       
The survival model includes controls for the total number of ratings at exit or end 
of panel, time-varying county level characteristics, price category of the 
restaurant, and dummies for year of entry. 
 
 
